Introduction

In this paper, I will answer the question “what is modern about Kant’s conceptions of space?”, by approaching Kant[1] within a framework of inquiry established by Heidegger. I shall argue that Kant’s theory of space is modern in this sense: it reflects an orientation to the world in which reason actively structures nature through pre-given forms. I develop this claim in three stages. First, I reconstruct Kant’s account of the synthetic a priori and the role of space and time as necessary forms of intuition. Second, I examine how this account emerges from a broader methodological (Copernican) revolution described in the Critique’s B-Preface — a revolution in which reason compels nature to answer only the questions it has itself designed. Third, I turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of the mathematical in What Is a Thing? Before turning to the question about what ‘mathematical’ means, I first need to give a rough overview of Kant’s transcendental idealism.

1. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and the Role of Space and Time

To grasp why Kant’s conception of space counts as distinctively modern, we must understand the broader framework in which it functions. This section reconstructs Kant’s transcendental idealism to show how space and time, as forms of sensibility, exemplify a mathematically structured projection that discloses nature in advance through a priori form.

    1. Kant’s Critical Project: On the Possibility Synthetic A Priori Knowledge

The Critique of Pure Reason is aimed at answering the question: how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible? That is to say, how is it possible that we can increase our knowledge without empirical inquiry, by the use of pure reason? (B19). Kant’s assumption, which gives rise to this question, is that we do actually have such knowledge, namely in mathematics and, as we shall see later, modern theoretical physics (B20). For Kant, explaining how mathematical knowledge, which to him is synthetic a priori, is possible could likewise explain how metaphysics is possible, the latter also being a science consisting of synthetic a priori judgments (B20/B21).[2]

The answer to this question is his transcendental idealism: the view that the conditions for the possibility of experience are supplied by the subject’s own faculties. The controversial consequence of this view is that we can only know the world as it appears to us. As we shall discuss in more detail later, this conclusion amounts to grounding objectivity (of knowledge) in subjectivity. Thus, his transcendental idealism redefines an object as “that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united.” (B137) But first, the overview of Kant’s transcendental idealism.

Concepts of Intuition: the Bases of Objective Cognition

Kant aims to show that the human mind actively plays a role in structuring our experience and cognition of the world (why he has this aim is the topic of the next section). The two individually necessary but only jointly sufficient human faculties of cognition are what Kant calls sensibility and understanding. By means of our sensibility we receive representations, conscious awareness, through being affected by objects. This capacity for being affected, receptivity, grants us a type of representation called intuitions (B24/A20). By means of the understanding, we can cognize the objects given in intuition, i.e. apply concepts to them.

Why does Kant regard these, concept and intuition, as the necessary components of all knowledge? We can see why by examining his famous dictum that “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” (A51/B76) As Lucy Allais puts it, Kant’s dictum expresses the view that

“concepts alone cannot ensure that there are actually any objects that our judgments are about, which is why objective cognition requires that there must be some representations which present objects to consciousness; what provides this is intuition.”[3]

Why then, is a thought without intuition empty? Because intuition provides the content of our thoughts. Intuitions are what provide thoughts with intentionality, i.e. with “aboutness.” For our purposes, let’s define intentionality as a determinate consciousness of the world. What is so important about intentionality? It marks the difference between speculation (which characterized the metaphysical tradition of Kant’s predecessors) and genuine knowledge.

Kant distinguishes between merely thinking an object and cognizing an object. An object is merely thought when the use of a concept does not correspond to an intuition. Add intuition, however, and mere thought becomes cognition. The notion of intuition explains how our thoughts can be about the world, and therefore, what amounts to the same in different words, intuition is what gives cognition objective validity. For Kant, we only relate to objects through intuition (A19/B33). Therefore, without thought (at some point) relating to intuitions, there is no way it could intelligibly be related to the world as it affects our minds (A19/B33; B146).[4] Kant’s task for vindicating metaphysics’ status as a science, then, depends on his success in showing whether and how metaphysics as a “pure rational cognition from mere concepts” (MF 4:469) could expand our knowledge of objects.

For cognitions to have objective validity, there must be some way in which our conceptual judgments are constrained by what they purport to be about. If there were no way of explaining how our conceptual activity relates to the world, there would be no way of knowing whether thinking and judging is, to use McDowell’s phrase, just a “frictionless spinning in a void.”[5] Kant wants to show how our use of concepts can have any bearing on the world. That is why it is important for Kant to show exactly the human mind is given objects, and how our use of concepts relates to it.

The Role of Space and Time in Objective Validity

Space and time, for Kant, or rather the representations thereof, play a crucial role in Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism, for they “make possible synthetic a priori propositions.” (A39/B56). Because representation through concepts is only objectively valid if it refers to a possible object of experience, the subjective forms of sensibility are also the necessary (albeit not sufficient) conditions of intelligibility tout court. Space and time thus serve not merely as enabling conditions but as structuring projections that prefigure the possibility of scientific knowledge Space and time are not given by nature but given to nature by us.

In this sense, Kant grounds objectivity in subjectivity. This is the crucial link to my overall argument: it is this grounding that makes space and time mathematical in Heidegger’s sense—but not because they allow for quantifying nature. Rather because they constitute its very intelligibility in advance, through the subject’s form-giving activity. We shall now have a more detailed examination of Kants treatment of space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Once, that is done, we will have laid the groundwork for answering the question: what is modern about Kant’s theory of space and time?

The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Form of Appearance

The Transcendental Aesthetic answers the question—what does reason contribute to intuition which allow us to represent objects as given? According to Kant, our sensory representation of the world is structured by the a priori forms of sensibility or pure intuitions: the representations of space and time (A20/B34) Pure intuitions are distinct form empirical intuitions. Empirical intuitions arise from the confrontation with something independent of reason. Such an object of experience Kant calls appearance (A20/B34).

Whereas the pure intuitions only contains what belongs to the mind itself—namely, the forms of sensibility— the latter also contains something else: sensation (A20/B34). That content of appearance which corresponds with sensation is its matter. Just like how, as we saw above, intuitions refer concepts to objects, so do sensations “refer” intuitions to empirical, i.e. concrete and particular objects.[6]Pure intuitions on the other hand, are as Kieran Setiya writes “intuitions to which sensation makes no contribution.”[7] They only have form. By the form of an appearance, Kant means that which allows the many and various objects of experience (‘the manifold of appearance’) to be given as “being ordered in certain relations” (A20/B34). Form tells us not so much what characterizes objects individually, but rather, what characterizes objects insofar as they are interrelated, undetermined elements within a single structured whole (i.e. in temporal and spatial relations i.e. as being in space and time).

It is important for Kant’s project that space and time are the a priori forms of our sensibility. He argues for the transcendental ideality of space and time as follows. Form is how sensations are ordered. But since this ordering principle of sensation cannot itself be another sensation (which are by definition a posteriori), this means that the form of pure intuition (that is to say, what belongs to the representation of any possible object of experience) must be a priori.

Kant argues that the representations of space and time are a priori are presupposed by every experience and therefore cannot be learned from it (A23/B38).

Space and time are the “pure forms of sensibility” or alternatively, “pure intuitions.” (A20/B34). Space is the form of the appearances of outer sense (A26/B42). From that epistemic point he draws the controversial conclusion that space and time “belong only to the mind” and are thus “nothing in themselves” (B41).[8] Space does not represent a property of objects nor a relation between objects (A26/B42) They therefore constitute the structure of givenness, of the concept of an object in general; i.e. the form in which anything whatsoever can be given to us.

2. Kant’s Copernican Revolution and the Mathematical Project

This section explains how Kant’s epistemological claims about space and time emerge from a broader methodological shift in modern science. Drawing on the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, it interprets Kant’s Copernican Revolution as an explicit philosophical formalization of what Heidegger calls the “mathematical” orientation: the projection of intelligibility onto nature by the subject.

Kant’s Copernican Revolution

The general maxim of the Copernican Revolution of the Critique is that “we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.” (Bxviii): whatever universal, necessary order we find in experience (such as the laws of nature) must arise from the subject’s contribution otherwise we could never secure rationally grounded knowledge in advance of experience. Objective knowledge, in short, is only possible by orienting cognition from the side of the subject. Reason, is thus not found in nature, but projected there from its source: the human mind.

2.1. The second Preface and the Transformation of Natural Science

In the Preface to the second edition of the CPR, Kant recalls the history of the development of the modern science of his day. Two fields of inquiry, for Kant, since the beginning, traveled upon “the secure course of a science” (Bvii-xi): logic and mathematics. From his recount of this history, it seems that science means for him: certainty. The certainty of mathematics, as we shall see, is what Kant tried to demonstrate. In addition, he took the certainty of mathematics as the ideal to which metaphysics ought to rise if it is to become a proper science.

Mathematics, which has “from the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable people the Greeks, traveled the secure path of a science.” (Bx) While mathematics, Kant writes, was for a long time “groping about” in the dark (Bxi), “a new light broke upon” Thales, when he discovered the method of construction in geometry (Bxi). According to Kant, Thales discovered that the inquiry into geometrical figures can result in well-founded a priori knowledge, not by gleaning knowledge through observing, say a triangle. Rather, “in order to know something securely a priori he had to ascribe to the thing nothing except what followed necessarily from what he himself had put into it in accordance with its concept” (Bxii). Though geometrical construction has to start from “what he himself had put into it,” the validity of its results is grounded on such results being the logical consequence, i.e. necessary entailment of the combination of its initial posits. What Kant found remarkable is that, by reasoning (that is, thinking restrained by its own laws (logic) from the a priori concept of a triangle Thales had secured something about empirical or a posteriori triangles (Bxii).

What was even more remarkable for Kant was the Scientific Revolution, in which natural science eventually “found the highway of science.” That is to say, Kant observed that the physics of his day had developed a theoretical attitude which could produce insights about nature which stood on the same sturdy grounds as mathematics. Just like with Thales, Kant writes, “a light dawned on all those who study nature”:

“When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or when Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be equal to that of a known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed metals into calx and then changed the latter back into metal by first removing something and the putting it back again […]

2.2. Reason’s Legislative Role in Nature

For Kant, the rise of modern science that scientific knowledge—that is knowledge grounded on a foundation of rational certainty, exemplified the realization that “reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design,” and that it “must take the lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were in leading-strings.” (Bxiii) Experiments like Galileo’s rolling balls show that reason extracts lawfulness from phenomena by designing the conditions of inquiry. The empirical world becomes intelligible only through a structure contributed by reason.

2.3. Objectivity Grounded in the Subject’s Contribution

The claim that experience is partly a priori constituted by the pure forms of sensibility, space and time, is quite important for Kant’s account of objective validity. Heidegger writes that “only where thinking thinks itself is it absolutely mathematical, i.e., a taking cognizance of that which we already have.”[9]

Heidegger on the Mathematical and the Modern

Heidegger on the mathematical

Heidegger’s concept of the “mathematical,” refers not primarily to number or calculation. But if this does not refer to measurement and calculation—which he terms mathematical in the narrow sense—,[10] what else could it refer to? Heidegger’s characterization of the mathematical, to be sure, is not wholly divorced from the familiar sense of the term. Rather, the familiar sense of mathematical as related to mathematics is “only a particular formation of the mathematical.”[11] The mathematical in the broader sense, as what is distinctly modern “must consist in what rules and determines the basic movement of science itself.”[12]

For Heidegger, the mathematical refers to the anticipatory projection that structures how nature can appear. Drawing on the original Greek meaning of mathēsis as “learning,” Heidegger claims that true learning involves grasping objects through categories we already possess. Scientific knowledge arises not from passively receiving data, but from subjecting phenomena to a pre-given framework i.e. what is mathematically knowable, calculable is what we have already projected as such.

For Heidegger, this projection becomes definitive in modern science. Newton’s physics exemplifies it by framing nature in terms of measurable forces and quantities; Kant formalizes it by showing how space and time, as pure forms of intuition, condition the possibility of any appearance whatsoever. Thus, while Newton deploys the mathematical practically, Kant articulates it philosophically: the structure of experience itself is governed by principles reason gives to nature in advance.

Heidegger develops the metaphysical concept of the mathematical from the original Greek meaning of mathesis, as teaching/learning. Heidegger says that “[l]earning is a kind of grasping and appropriating.”[13] Less ambiguously put, learning is a specific way of grasping and appropriating, of cognizing and interacting with things,

Our expression “the mathematical” always has two meanings. It means, first, what can be learned in the manner we have indicated, and only in that way, and, second, the manner of learning and the process itself. The mathematical is that evident aspect of things within which we are always already moving and according to which we experience them as things at all, and as such things.[14]

It seems warranted to say, at least, that the mathematical refers to the appropriate significance of our intentional object: what can be learned ‘in the manner we have indicated.’ The corresponding activity then, is the learning. But what is this ‘manner of learning and the process itself’? Heidegger gives content to the mathematical by characterizing “true learning” as occurring “ only where the taking of what one already has is a self-giving and is experienced as such.”[15] He gives as example, the cognition of “the body as the bodily, the plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the animal, the thingness of the thing, and so on.”[16] Besides ‘self-giving’, this properly mathematical manner of learning “must also be experienced as such.” What are we to make of this? It almost seems like true learning, as the activity proper to the mathematical, implies transcendental cognition; that is, the cognition of objects self-consciously by means of categories of the understanding.

The mathemata, the mathematical, is that “about” things which we really already know. Therefore we do not first get it out of things, but, in a certain way, we bring it already with us.[17]

While, in the end, this shall be the most ambitious form of it, it cannot be all that mathematical cognition means—for now. For Newton was not a Kantian. So, in what sense is Heidegger calling Newton’s physics ‘mathematical’? Here, Heidegger gives us a familiar example of the genuine learning that involves the mathematical—the use of number:

We see three chairs and say that there are three. What “three” is the three chairs do not tell us, nor three apples, three cats, nor any other three things. Rather, we can count three things only if we already know “three.” In thus grasping the number three as such, we only expressly recognized something which, in some way, we already have.[18]

Following this passage, Heidegger gives a demonstration of why numbers are mathematical in the special sense.

Things do not help us to grasp “three” as such, i.e., threeness. “Three”—what exactly is it? It is the number in the natural series of numbers that stands in third place. In “third”? It is only the third number because it is the three. And “place”—where do places come from? “Three” is not the third number, but the first number. “One” isn’t really the first number. For instance, we have before us one loaf of bread and one knife, this one and, in addition, another one. When we take both together we say, “both of these,: the one and the other, but we do not say, “these two,” or 1 + 1. Only when we add a cup to the bread and the knife do we say “all.” Now when we take them as a sum, i.e., as a whole and so and so many. Only when we perceive it from the third is the former one the first, the former other the second, so that one and two arise, and “and” becomes “plus,” and there arises the possibility of places and of a series. What we now take cognizance of is not drawn from any of the things. We take what we ourselves somehow already have. What must be understood as mathematical is what we can learn in this way.[19]

This concept of what is mathematical, as that which can be learned on the basis of construction through a priori concepts brings us already to Kant’s conception of mathematical cognition:

Pure rational cognition from mere concepts is called pure philosophy or metaphysics; by contrast, that which grounds its cognition only on the construction of concepts, by means of the presentation of the object in an a priori intuition, is called mathematics. (MF 4:469)

In what follows, I examine how differing conceptions of nature shape and guide scientific inquiry. First, drawing on Heidegger’s comparison of Aristotelian and Newtonian physics, I show how each worldview frames the intelligibility of nature in distinct ways: Aristotle conceives of nature as internally purposive (teleologically), whereas Newton treats it as externally governed by universal laws (mechanically). Each conception gives rise to a distinct mode of inquiry.

First, by looking at Heidegger’s comparison of Aristotelian and Newtonian physics, we shall see how each of their respective conceptions of nature structures and direct the scientific inquiry into nature. Heidegger contrasts Aristotelian physics and Newtonian physics in terms of an essentially different “manner of working with things” and “metaphysical projection of the thingness of the things.”[20] But we must be careful not to fall into the common sense picture that Heidegger explicitly rejected at the outset. As stated, the difference does not, in the first place, lie in the method. Nor does it lie in appeal to observation (as opposed to arm chair theorizing). More prosaically put, the essential difference lies in the metaphysical or a priori conception of the (formal?) object of inquiry. The representations of space and time structure our experience of nature and which, in turn, governs our cognitive and practical attitudes towards it.

Second, we add Kant to this comparative framework. By inserting Kant’s conception of nature, space and time into the framework within which Heidegger differentiates Aristotelian physics from Newtonian physics, we can then see what Newton and Kant‘s mathematical views share; more importantly, however, it allows us to see how Kant diverges from Newton by radicalizing mathematical orientation to nature. This then sets the stage for the final section, in which the relation between the mathematical and the modern is explained.

The Modernity of Kant’s Theory

Heidegger’s comparison of Aristotle and Newton highlights how differing conceptions of nature guide scientific inquiry. For Aristotle, nature is inherently purposive: motion is teleological, governed by a thing’s internal nature and its striving toward its natural place. Newton, by contrast, conceives of nature as mechanistic, where motion results from externally imposed forces. Yet both take nature as something that must “show itself” to the inquirer; what distinguishes them is not the role of observation, but the metaphysical structure imposed on what is observed. This contrast sets the stage for understanding how Kant inherits and transforms both views.

We are now in a position to see how Kant’s theory of space and time concretely realizes the mathematical projection Heidegger attributes to modern science. For Heidegger, the mathematical signifies a prior disclosure of what must count as an object, one that structures inquiry before any empirical contact. But this projection remains largely formal in Heidegger’s account. Kant, by contrast, gives this structure determinate philosophical content: the forms of space and time are not merely regulative assumptions but the pure intuitions that make appearances intelligible at all. They provide the a priori form through which the manifold of sensation is ordered and unified into an object of experience. In Kant’s transcendental aesthetic, then, we find a rigorous account of the very conditions that makes the application of Heidegger’s sense mathematical appropriate—conditions that are subjective in origin yet foundational for the possibility of nature itself. The mathematical, in Kant, becomes a transcendental condition for the givenness of nature as law-governed appearance.

Modern Philosophy’s Demand for Unconditioned Grounding

Third, we examine why Heidegger characterizes the mathematical as a fundamentally modern orientation towards nature. Modern philosophy aims to ground all rational knowledge on an unconditioned, or indubitable foundation. Descartes found such an unshakeable ground in the undoubtable certainty of self-consciousness. Since the only absolute certainty is self-consciousness, it follows that all rational justifications, eventually, must themselves be justified on the basis of this absolutely certain, unconditioned, and therefore final, justification.

In the Refutation of Idealism, Kant avoids Descartes’ “problematic idealism,” according to which “the existence of objects in space outside us [are] either merely doubtful and indemonstrable” (B274). In opposition to Descartes, who moved from the cogito to skepticism, Kant’s transcendental idealism is constituted by the claim that the absolute certainty of self-consciousness necessarily presupposes the existence of objects outside of us. Similarly, Kant says that “all thought […] must ultimately be related to intuitions, thus n our case, to sensibility since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us.” (A19/B33) Without the a priori representation of space, no objects could be represented as outside of ourselves and related to each other (A23/38).

Transcendental Grounding of Scientific Objectivity

Space and time constitute the transcendental framework through which objects of experience, and thus scientific knowledge, become possible. Thus, mathematical knowledge is knowledge of what is self-given. Space, as priori intuition, is a formgiven by reason to itself: “Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e. , the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.

For Kant, then, the representations of space and time relates the subject to nature, on terms defined by the subject—or rather, terms that define subjectivity i.e. the possibility of experience: purely rational knowledge of nature is possible because human reason imposes intelligibility order on the experience of nature. For Kant, reason does not exist in the nature—the world of nature (an ordered whole) only exists in reason:

“we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity in them that we call nature and moreover we would not be able to find it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it there.” (A125)

Conclusion

We began by reconstructing Kant’s theory of space and time within the framework of transcendental idealism. There, we saw that space is not an empirical feature of the world, but an a priori form of intuition—a subjective condition that enables the synthesis of appearances. Far from undermining objectivity, this move grounds it in the subject’s contribution to cognition. Space, as a pure form, is what makes objects of experience possible at all.

From this epistemological foundation, we turned to the B-Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant situates his critical project within the broader transformation of science. Drawing on the success of mathematics and physics, he argues that reason must actively legislate the conditions under which nature can be known. This is the main insight of his Copernican revolution: knowledge does not conform to objects, but objects conform to the conditions of knowledge. Space, as a necessary precondition of experience, exemplifies this projection. Its function is not descriptive but constitutive.

Heidegger’s analysis in What Is a Thing? allowed us to clarify what this projection entails. Through his example of number, Heidegger shows that mathematical knowledge arises not from the world but from what we already bring to it. The mathematical, in his sense, names a fundamental mode of disclosure, of making things in the world appear by anticipating their structure. Kant’s space is mathematical in precisely this sense: it is the condition that renders nature intelligible in advance.

He does not refine earlier conceptions of space; he transforms its philosophical function. No longer a property of things, space becomes a medium of appearance, a form through which nature becomes accessible to cognition. This shift reflects the modern conviction that intelligibility must begin with the subject’s own conditions for knowing—not with the world as it is in itself.

Bibliography

Allais, Lucy. “IV—Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 110, no. 1pt1 (2010): 47–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00279.x.

Allison, Henry E. “The Non-Spatiality of Things in Themselves for Kant.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 14, no. 3 (July 1976): 313–21. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0364.

Heidegger, Martin. What Is a Thing. Translated by W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch. South Bend, Ind: Regnery, 1967.

Kant, Immanuel. Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Edited by Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath. Translated by Gary C. Hatfield and Michael Friedman. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

McDowell, John Henry. Mind and World: With a New Introduction. 1. Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed., 8. print. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003.

Setiya, Kieran. “Transcendental Idealism in the ‘Aesthetic.’” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, no. 1 (January 2004): 63–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00326.x.

  1. Names of individual works (all cited from Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, eds. Henry Allison and Peter Heath. with exception of the Critique of Pure Reason) will be abbreviated as follows:

    CPR = Critique of Pure Reason

    P = Prolegomena to any future metaphysics

    MF = Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science

    For references to the CPR I follow the standard (A/B) format. ↑

  2. Allais, “IV—Kant’s Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic,” 49. ↑

  3. Allais, 61. ↑

  4. B146: “To think and object and to cognize an object are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition, through which it is given; for if an intuition corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then it would be a thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, and by its means no cognition of anything at all would be possible, since, as far as I would know, nothing would be given nor could be given to which my thought could be applied.” ↑

  5. McDowell, Mind and World, 11. ↑

  6. I put “refer” in scare quotes, because sensations, in Kant’s account, are not representations of objects, but rather the modification of a subjects’ state as affected by what only (logically) later turns out to be an object. ↑

  7. Setiya, “Transcendental Idealism in the ‘Aesthetic,’” 72. ↑

  8. This conclusion has been the subject of the so-called ‘neglected alternative’ objection to Kant’s conception of space. See e.g. Allison, “The Non-Spatiality of Things in Themselves for Kant.” ↑

  9. Heidegger, What Is a Thing, 278. ↑

  10. Heidegger, 254. ↑

  11. Heidegger, 249. ↑

  12. Heidegger, 250. ↑

  13. Heidegger, 251. ↑

  14. Heidegger, 253–54. ↑

  15. Heidegger, 251. ↑

  16. Heidegger, 251. ↑

  17. Heidegger, 252. ↑

  18. Heidegger, 252. ↑

  19. Heidegger, 252–53. ↑

  20. Heidegger, 250. ↑